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Abstract. This article is the shortened version of the national report submitted to International Academy of 
Comparative Law. It summarizes and describes the present situation of the Hungarian Private International Law by 
analyzing the Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 on Private International Law (hereafter referred to as Code). The Law 
Decree is the ﬁ rst legal instrument in the history of the Hungarian PIL which has been modiﬁ ed signiﬁ cantly with 
the aim of harmonization with European Law since 2004. The major part of the article deals with deﬁ ning the 
different aspects of theoretical approach which provides a profound interpretation of Hungarian PIL in scientiﬁ c 
terms. On the other hand, the applied scientiﬁ c approach serves as a guideline for ﬁ lling legal gaps in the Hungarian 
PIL Code. In addition to this, the article gives an overview of the Hungarian judicial application of PIL rules 
emphasizing the eclectic and contradictory character of the jurisdiction in Hungary.
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I. Brief History
Although in the 19th century there was no uniﬁ ed private international law (PIL) in Hungary, 
there existed rules regarding PIL in certain domestic statutes. Bilateral international 
agreements played an important role, such as the trade agreement concluded with the USA 
in 1929, and various other agreements on legal assistance.
In the 20th century, up to the end of the Second World War, regulations regarding 
private international law continued to appear scattered in various different enactments. This 
accidental and rather chaotic method of legislation on Hungarian private international law 
made necessary a comprehensive codiﬁ cation of the law on this ﬁ eld.
In 1948, István Szászy, professor of private international law, introduced a draft which 
regulated in great detail both the general and speciﬁ c questions of PIL. The draft, which 
was prepared with excellent scientiﬁ c erudition, reﬂ ected the theoretical achievements of 
the age as well as Hungarian judicial practice. The political changes taking place at the end 
of the 1940s in Hungary, namely the communist takeover of political power, had a negative 
impact on the future of the draft. It was declared anti-democratic, reﬂ ecting capitalist values, 
therefore unacceptable. Professor István Szászy was forced to stop teaching and had to 
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remain silent for a long time. The question of the codiﬁ cation of Hungarian private 
international law did not arise for another two decades. 
Works of codiﬁ cation were started in 1966 under the conduct of the Legal Institute of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and the second draft was completed in 1968. The 
Ministry of Justice took over the conduct of codiﬁ cation, and by 1970 another draft had 
been completed. The fourth draft was ready in 1978, accepted in 1979, and made public as 
Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 on Private International Law (hereinafter referred to as Code).
Minor modiﬁ cations have been made on the Hungarian PIL Code several times. More 
comprehensive modiﬁ cations started to take place from the beginning of 2000, primarily 
with the aim of harmonization with European law. In 2000, sections IX and XI, dealing 
with jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgements, were re-regulated, and they 
were further modiﬁ ed in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. Hungary has ratiﬁ ed the Convention 
of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (hereinafter referred to as Rome 
Convention) in 2006.1 The last modiﬁ cation took place in accordance with the results of EU 
uniﬁ cation of private international law. Act No. IX of 2009 is mainly a technical modiﬁ cation 
with the primary aim of drawing attention to the fact that beside EC Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations2 (hereinafter referred to as Rome II) and EC 
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations3 (hereinafter referred to as Rome 
I) the Hungarian Code can only be applied to a limited extent. The amendments have also 
introduced a new provision in Section II concerning private individuals; it complemented 
previous provisions with a further rule regarding the use of name by natural persons.
The structure of the Code is the following: it consists of three big parts and eleven 
sections. Altogether there are 75 articles dealing with the basic questions of private 
international law (General and Special Part) as well as with issues regarding jurisdiction 
and certain procedural questions. Section I, called General Rules, contains provisions 
concerning the purpose of the law-book and certain basic PIL legal institutions such as 
qualiﬁ cation, renvoi, determination of the content of foreign law, reciprocity, ordre public 
(public policy) clause, and fraudulent connection. The Special Part from Sections II to VIII 
determines the conﬂ icts rules applicable to persons, law of intellectual property, property 
law and related rights, obligations, succession, family and labour law. Sections IX to XI 
contain regulations regarding jurisdiction, procedural law and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgements. The Code itself is not too long; all the former drafts 
were longer. Therefore, the regulation of certain questions is rather brief and the deﬁ nition 
of certain conﬂ icts law institutions such as incidental question, the deﬁ nition of international 
mandatory rules (lois d’application immédiate) is missing. These gaps have to be ﬁ lled by 
judicial practice, which however does not apply uniform solutions.
The purpose and operation of the Hungarian Code is governed by the Articles 1 and 2. 
Article 1 states that the Code has a double purpose. First, in cases where elements of foreign 
private law are involved, it chooses from the conﬂ icting legal systems the one whose 
substantive law should be applied (substantive law aim). Second, it determines what 
procedures the court should follow (procedural law aim). An element can be regarded as 
important foreign element only if it is relevant to the case. If the case contains foreign 
1 Act No. XXVIII of 2006.
2 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, 40–49.
3 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, 6–16.
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elements but they are not relevant to the judgement of the case, or if the case does not 
contain any foreign elements, the Hungarian Code cannot be applied.4 The Code emphasises 
its own subsidiarity when it declares in Article 2 that it “shall not apply to matters governed 
by international treaty”. This provision is in harmony with Hungary’s international 
obligations. 
Naturally, the law sources of the European Community enjoy priority to the application 
of the Code. The priority of community law applies, e.g. to contract and tort law,5 where the 
rules of Rome I and Rome II regulations prevail against the regulations of the Hungarian 
PIL Code. The scope of the Code extends only to cases which are not included in or 
regulated by these European instruments. 
II. General Methodology
1. Legal Certainty and Flexibility
European – and therefore Hungarian – private international law follows the traditional 
model based on the system developed by Savigny. However, certain important modiﬁ cations 
and changes in approach make this system more ﬂ exible and less certain. Modern European 
choice-of-law doctrine introduces ﬂ exibility in a number of ways, including alternative 
references, “soft” connecting factors and escape clauses. As a result, legal certainty and 
ﬂ exibility appear together in recent private international law codiﬁ cations. Professor Hay 
described the second half of the 20th century as one in which “the tension between 
predictability and ﬂ exibility is the hallmark of conﬂ icts law”.6 The resolution of this tension 
presents a dilemma in the development of private international law in the 21st century as 
well: How would it be possible to ﬁ nd a proper balance between the two principles?
We should therefore raise the question concerning Hungarian codiﬁ cation as well. How 
and to what extent do legal certainty and ﬂ exibility work together in the Hungarian Code? 
Is there an appropriate balance between the two doctrines? Unfortunately, the negative 
answer has not changed in the past ten years. As Professor Burián stated earlier: “Despite 
the contrary wishes of Hungarian commentators, the Hungarian PIL codiﬁ cation has put the 
overwhelming weight on the guarantee of security and foreseeability, and has neglected 
ﬂ exibility.” 7
4 The foreign plaintiff is the sole proprietor of a Hungarian Ltd., who is defendant I. The plaintiff 
has turned to the court because in his/her opinion during the liquidation process the real-estate of the 
defendant was sold unlawfully to defendants II and III, who are also Hungarian. The Supreme Court 
stated that concerning the validity of the sales contract the fact that the plaintiff is of foreign nationality 
is irrelevant, for the sale was concluded between Hungarian parties. Therefore, the application of the 
Hungarian Code was omitted and the legal dispute was settled based on Hungarian substantive law. 
(Supreme Court Gf. II. 20. 176/2007/5)
5 The third regulation is concerned with matters relating to maintenance obligations. Council 
Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 
10.1.2009, 1–79.
6 See Hay, P.: Flexibility versus predictability and uniformity in choice of law: reﬂ ections on 
current European and United States conﬂ icts law. Recueil des cours, 226 (1992), 304.
7 For the reasons more details, see Burián, L.: Hungarian Private International Law at the End 
of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? In: Symeonides, S. (ed.): Private International Law at the 
End of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? The Hague, 2000, 268.
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Regarding speciﬁ c tools ensuring ﬂ exibility, the Hungarian legislator has not made any 
signiﬁ cant steps forward on the “ﬂ exibility scale”8. The Hungarian PIL Code does not allow 
the application of escape clauses in general or speciﬁ c ﬁ elds and it does not apply so called 
malleable approaches or similar formulae either. Divergence from the rigid rules is made 
possible mainly by the alternative reference rules (in more detail in V). As a result of the 
2009 modiﬁ cations, the main connecting factor in contract law, in the case of questions not 
included in the scope of the Rome I Regulation, has become the “closest connection”. 
Moreover, the modiﬁ ed Code allows the application of the choice of law in a limited form, 
concerning name bearing if the person is the citizen of more than one country (see XIII/1). 
These latter changes are undoubtedly the result of the activities of the European Community 
in the ﬁ eld of PIL. EU membership has given Hungarian PIL codiﬁ cation a new “impetus” 
to move towards ﬂ exibility: the developing nature of community law has become an 
important factor in the “quiet evolution”9.
2. State-Selection and “Conﬂ icts Justice” versus “Content-Oriented Law-Selection” 
and “Material Justice”
Demand for the enforcement of material justice (material justice deﬁ cit) has a central place 
in works of criticism regarding conﬂ icts law. The line of reasoning goes that it is not 
permissible to limit private international law to the selection of the applicable law; the 
material justice of the decision has to be taken into consideration as well. 
Instead of delving into the nature of the relationship between the categories listed in 
the title, we will refer to Professor Vischer, who stated that “[t]he aim of traditional bilateral 
conﬂ ict rules is “conﬂ ict justice” [“Kollisionsrechtliche Gerechtigkeit” (Kegel)] and not 
primarily the just substantive solution, […] the substantive result is subjects to control by 
the ordre public”.10 Thus, conﬂ icts justice requires no more than an allocation of legal 
relationship to those legal systems in which they have their “seat” (Savigny). Of necessity, 
this mechanism pays no attention to the quality of result it produces. Realizing the 
phenomenon and its negative consequences, in recent years there has been more and more 
emphasis on the corrective function of material justice in codiﬁ ed private international 
systems as well. Professor Symeonides has aptly described this process as “conﬂ icts justice 
tempered by material justice”.11
The Hungarian PIL Code actually is viewed as “the bastion of the classical view”,12 for 
it consists mainly of traditional conﬂ ict-of-law rules (or jurisdiction-selecting rules, as they 
were referred to by Cavers). The resulting blindfold application of conﬂ ict rules is 
traditionally corrected by the ordre public exception (ruled by Article 7).13 The Code 
    8 See Symeonides, S. C.: The American choice-of-law revolution in the courts: today and 
tomorrow. Recueil des cours, 298 (2003), 410.
    9 See ibid. 407.
10 Vischer, F.: General course on private international law. Recueil des cours, 232 (1993), 93.
11 Symeonides: The American choice-of-law revolution… op. cit. 403–404.
12 See ibid. 400.
13 The rule that allows both parties in a contract (Hungarian PIL Code Article 24) to select in 
advance the applicable law is content-oriented rule, but not necessarily result-oriented, and the same 
can be said about another rule of the Code, which allows both parties to agree to the application of the 
lex fori after the events that gave rise to the dispute (Article 9). In more detail about the theoretical 
connections, see Symeonides, S. C.: Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Progress 
or Regress? General Report – XVth International Congress of Comparative Law. In: Symeonides, S. 
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contains very few other exceptions – mainly result-oriented rules – which consider the 
content of conﬂ icting laws as well.14 The reason for that is that since its coming into force 
in 1979, there have been no comprehensive, modernizing modiﬁ cations on the Hungarian 
PIL Code. As a result, modern approaches to conﬂ icts law such as the application of 
alternative connecting factors, ﬂ exible connecting factors, escape clauses, choice of law etc. 
appear very seldom, or not at all in the Code. 
However a few above mentioned rules may be found in certain articles, such as those 
on the following subject:15
(a) rules favouring the validity of certain juridical acts:
(i) testaments: the article embodying the policy of favor testamenti provides that a testament 
shall be considered formally valid if it conforms to any one of the following ﬁ ve substantive 
law: the Hungarian law; the lex personae of the testator’s at either the time of making or the 
time of death; the law of the testator’s domicile or habitual residence at either the time of 
making or the time of death; the law of the place of making; in the case of immovables, the 
law of the situs [Article 36 (2)].
(ii) other juridical acts: the article embodying the policy of favor negotii provides an 
alternative-reference rule, a contract is formally valid if it conforms to lex contractus; lex 
fori, the law of the place of making or where the intended legal consequences are to take 
effect. [Article 29 (2)]. (We should note that this rule differs in some aspects from Article 
11 of the Rome I Regulation.)
b) rules favouring a certain status:
(i) based on the principle of favor divortii there is a unilateral rule in the Code, according to 
which a marriage can be dissolved under the lex fori even if the applicable foreign law does 
not allow dissolution [Article 41 (a)].
c) rules favouring one party:
(i) choice of law by, or for the beneﬁ t of, one party
Pre-dispute choice by one party
Until recently, choice of law was only possible within the ﬁ eld of contracts in Hungarian 
PIL. However, the 2009 modiﬁ cations on the Code have changed the situation, for the 
option of pre-dispute choice by one party has been introduced. The modernization has been 
made with regard to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in 
the Garcia Avello case.16 The new provision concerning name bearing makes it possible that 
in the case of individuals with dual citizenship (Hungarian and foreign), not only the 
Hungarian substantive law,17 but the rules of the relevant foreign country may be applied 
upon the request of the person in question [Article 10(2)].
(ed.): Private International Law at the End of the 20th Century: Progress or Regress? The Hague, 
2000, 39.
14 See also Burián: op. cit. 271.
15 The aspects of classiﬁ cation are in alignment with the division made by Symeonides. See 
Symeonides: Private International Law… In: Symeonides (ed.): Private International Law… op. cit. 
45–62.
16 C-148/02. Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613.
17 See Article 11
   (2) If a person has multiple citizenships, and one of his citizenships is Hungarian, his personal 
law will be the Hungarian law.
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Post-dispute choice by the court
Regarding questions of delictual liability outside of the scope of the Rome II Regulation (in 
more detail in XII), the Hungarian PIL Code establishes the rule of lex loci delicti as the 
main rule: it is the law prevailing at the place and time of the tortuous act or omission. 
However paragraph 2, based on the principle of favor laesi, provides that “[i]f it is more 
favourable for the injured party, the law of that state shall apply, in the territory of which 
the damage occurred” [Article 33(2)]. This rule assigns the choice to the court to be made 
for the victim’s beneﬁ t. Sometimes it happens in Hungarian judicial practice that this rule 
serves as a hidden device for the application of the lex fori.18
There is a special provision in the Code with regard to the infringement of personal 
rights. This unilateral rule states that “if the Hungarian law is more favourable for the 
person suffering the injury in respect of the resultant compensation or indemniﬁ cation, the 
claims shall be adjudged according to that law” [Article 10(3)].
In addition, a rule favouring the child appears. Regarding the status of the child and its 
family relationship Article 46 provides that “[t]he Hungarian law shall apply to the family 
legal status of a Hungarian citizen child or a child residing in Hungary, to the family law 
relationships between him and his parents, as well as to the obligation of maintenance 
provided for the child, if it is more favourable for the child”.
(ii) protecting consumers or employees from the consequences of an adverse choice of 
law clause: with regard to the fact that these type of contracts are governed by Articles 6 
and 8 of the Rome I Regulation, the former, partly different provisions of the Code were 
abolished with the 2009 modiﬁ cations. 
Based on the above we can conclude that the rules of the Hungarian PIL Code “bind 
the hands” of the Hungarian judge regarding the question of allowing the court to consider 
the content of the conﬂ icting laws and make the choice dependent on that content. These 
restrictions are presently eased by the law sources of the European Union in the ﬁ eld of PIL 
and by the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In the future, 
fundamental changes should be introduced by the comprehensive modiﬁ cation and 
modernization of the Code.
3. Unilateral Rules and Rules of Immediate Application
The unilateral conﬂ ict norms, similarly to the concept of the statute theory, determine the 
extent of the application of one’s own laws. In other words, a choice-of-law rule is deemed 
to be unilateral when it deﬁ nes the scope of application of the domestic law with respect to 
foreign element cases only, namely it determines the situations in which a fact of private 
international law is to be governed by the domestic law. By contrast, the complete 
(multilateral) conﬂ ict norms explicitly determine the law applicable in a particular case, 
irrespective of whether the process of selection leads to the application of domestic or 
foreign law. The Hungarian PIL Code, accepting Savigny’s approach, states that in private 
international law cases the complete (multilateral) conﬂ ict rules should be applied. 
In accordance with the basic concept of the Code, Hungarian jurisprudence holds that 
the complete conﬂ ict norms are more suitable to fulﬁ l the function of PIL, since in a case of 
conﬂ ict judgement can be made on the basis of the law ensuring the fairest decision. The 
dominant view in the international legislative practice that the overwhelming majority of 
18 See also Burián: op. cit. 265.
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choice-of-law rules are made up of multilateral conﬂ ict norms and therefore the use of 
unilateral rules is justiﬁ ed only in a limited area, where the State deems it important to give 
effect to its legal-political considerations, such as the protection of the weaker party in 
consumer contracts.
We can seldom ﬁ nd unilateral conﬂ ict norms in the Hungarian Code, and the 
prerequisite for the application of these norms is the presence of a domestic interest. For 
example, Article 16(2) states: “Hungarian law shall apply in cases where, on behalf of a 
domestic legal interest, the Hungarian court declares a non-Hungarian national to be dead 
or missing, or determines the proof of death of such person.” Domestic legal interest is 
involved in the procedure if the legal relations of the missing person in Hungary have to be 
resolved; for example, if the missing person owns a property in Hungary, and he/she has to 
be declared legally dead to start the legal process of succession.
There is similar rationale behind Article 50 as well, which prescribes the application of 
Hungarian law if immediate measures have to be taken in the interest of the custody, support 
or care of a foreign citizen resident in Hungary. In such case the domestic interest is that the 
application of Hungarian law ensures fast procedure. 
The Code does not speciﬁ cally deal with the problem of régles d’application immédiate 
and the Hungarian jurisprudence does not seem to be interested in the question either. In my 
opinion, the reason for that is that in Hungarian PIL the similarities and differences between 
règles d’application immédiate and mandatory rules have not yet been examined from a 
dogmatic point of view. In most cases, the legal institution is regarded as a sub-branch of 
ordre public. Due to the lack of adequate legal background and legal theory, the practice of 
its application does not exist either. 
4. International Uniformity and Protection of National Interests
The theory of Savigny, developed in the middle of the 19th century, is still the cornerstone 
of the development of European conﬂ icts law regarding its main elements. The equality 
among domestic laws and the “international uniformity of decisions” (internationaler 
Entscheidungseinklang), which he placed in the centre, still applies. However, the model 
created by Savigny has been further developed, and it is still developing. The differentiation 
of the connecting factors and the encouragement of efforts aimed at reaching fair decisions 
have appeared, and there is an increasing emphasis on the enforcement of national interests 
as well.19 International uniformity as a laudable and desired goal has remained, but since 
the second half of the 20th century there has been an increasing demand for the protection 
of state or national interests, especially in the case of the forum state. Some describe that 
this is the period when conﬂ icts law has “lost its innocence”.20
With regard to instruments serving the protection of national interests, the Hungarian 
jurisprudence and the PIL Code do “not follow the position of promoting national interests 
directly by choice of law rules or methods”.21 Consequently, such rules as the preference 
19 See Burián, L.–Kecskés, L.–Vörös, I.: Magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog (Hungarian 
Private International Law). Budapest, 2005, 74–75.
20 See Vrellis, S.: Le droit international privé grec à la ﬁ n du vingtième siècle: progrès ou recul? 
In: Symeonides (ed.): Private International Law… op. cit. 247.
21 See Burián: op. cit. 266.
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given to the forum’s or third state’s international mandatory rules22 are not included in the 
Code. Besides the ordre public clause the Code also contains so-called unilateral rules 
speciﬁ cally designed to protect forum interests indirectly (“special ordre public rules”), e.g. 
with regard to the dissolution of marriage.23 According to leading scholars of the subject, 
this provision of the Code “opens too wide the gate of defence in ordre public”.24 The rule 
which allows the dissolution of marriage even if the conditions required by the applicable 
foreign law are not satisﬁ ed, but according to Hungarian family law they are met, is 
particularly unreasonable. In this respect, only the part declaring the theoretical possibility 
of the dissolution of the marriage may be justiﬁ ed, which however could also be concluded 
from the ordre public clause.
Moreover, certain rules of the Hungarian PIL Code indirectly encourage the forum to 
apply the lex fori, thereby promoting the protection of national interests. In Hungarian PIL, 
the unilateral regulation of renvoi (see VIII) or the fact that fraudulent connection is only 
sanctioned by the Code if it resulted in the application of a foreign law (domestic law has to 
be applied in case of fraudulent behaviour as well) are regulations promoting a homeward 
trend, and while their purpose is not the protection of national interest, they can be used as 
instruments to achieve such a goal as well.25
III. Some General Rules
1. Qualiﬁ cation
Article 3 of the Hungarian PIL Code contains explicit provisions on qualiﬁ cation, which is 
basically subject to the lex fori. Accordingly where there is a dispute about the legal 
qualiﬁ cation of the facts or relationships to be judged is being disputed, the interpretation of 
the rules and notions of Hungarian law shall be used by the forum. Thus the law in 
accordance with most legal systems assumes the prevailing view. As a subsidiary rule the 
Code declares if a legal institution is not known to Hungarian law, or is known but carries a 
different meaning or different name, then the judge shall qualify it with regard to the foreign 
law regulating the legal institution [Article 3(2)]. It is not clearly stated by the above article 
which foreign law to use for qualiﬁ cation, and it is up to the judge to decide. From the 
aspect of the purpose of qualiﬁ cation however it can be stated that it can only be derived 
from legal systems in conﬂ ict with each other in relation to the facts of the case. According 
22 In contrast with Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. In Article 3(4) of the Rome I Regulation 
besides the protection of national or state interests the protection of Community interests appears 
as well.
23 Article 41.
  The foreign law applicable to the dissolution of marriage shall apply with regard to the 
following differences:
  a) A marriage may be dissolved also if the foreign law excludes the dissolution of marriage, 
or the conditions of dissolution are not satisﬁ ed according to the foreign law but are satisﬁ ed according 
to the Hungarian law.
  b) The question of whether marital life has been completely and irreparably ruined shall be 
considered even is cases where absolute grounds for divorce are present according to the foreign law.
  c) The dissolution of marriage may not be based upon culpability.
24 See Mádl, F.–Vékás, L.: Nemzetközi magánjog és nemzetközi gazdasági kapcsolatok joga 
(The Law of Conﬂ icts and Foreign Trade). Budapest, 2004, 421.
25 Burián: op. cit. 266.
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to Professor Burián on the basis of text interpretation this can be the law of a third country 
with absolutely no reference to the facts of the case.
According to Professor Lajos Vékás26 the solution based on lex fori is unilateral 
because it starts exclusively from the interpretation of the conﬂ ict norm hypothesis while 
the problem is far more complex than that. Qualiﬁ cation on lex fori starts from the principle 
that conﬂ ict norm hypothesis includes all those domestic and foreign legal institutions that 
are subjects to legal regulation within the substantive law of the forum. Professor Vékás 
suggests breaking with this unilateral and rigid view and instead he proposes to combine 
the comparative law approach of Rabel and the functional interpretation approach of 
Kegel.
In the Hungarian judicial practice lex fori is usually applied for qualiﬁ cation.27
2. Renvoi
The Hungarian Code partly adopts the renvoi. Under Article 4 the scope of the reference 
must be interpreted in a narrow sense, thus except for reference back, the conﬂ ict rules of 
the applicable foreign law are not to be taken into account in general, but the rules of foreign 
law directly governing the matter must apply. Hence the Hungarian Code does not recognise 
a reference to third law because the foreign conﬂ ict rules to be applied can be ignored. The 
Hungarian forum therefore only accepts the renvoi on special occasions when it refers back 
to the Hungarian law. The general rule on renvoi is one of compromise, which does not 
always promote international harmonisation of decisions under the conﬂ ict-of-laws; 
however it vigorously serves the homeward trend.
In the Special Part of the PIL Code Article 21/A embodied in Act No. XXVII of 2004 
which contains a provision of the EC directive on ﬁ nancial collateral arrangements28 
excludes reference back considering ownership and other rights in rem recorded on deposit 
accounts or based on dematerialized securities.
Finally, the rules of Rome Convention, Rome I and Rome II also exclude the application 
of the renvoi, accordingly a Hungarian judge cannot apply this legal institution in case of 
26 Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 96.
27 There was a dispute between the parties over the terms of ﬁ nancial compensation of the 
management contract of a company. The plaintiff, a Slovak citizen and the defendant, a company 
domiciled in Hungary contracted for employment according to the German law on a tacit 
understanding, which should have required the application of the “Dienstvertrag” rules governed by 
BGB. This contract type is unknown to the Hungarian law, and above all it was misnamed as service 
relations. Service relations under Hungarian law mean service relations of professional members of 
the effective armed forces and services. The dispute in the given case however was between the 
managing director and the company. The Hungarian court had to take a stand on the issue of legal 
relationship between the parties. The personal law of the company is the Hungarian law, and under 
the Hungarian company law if the ofﬁ ce-holder is in position without legal relations then the agency 
contract law of Civil Code must be applied. The parties concerned identically stated that between 
them a civil law relationship was regulated, therefore the court qualiﬁ ed the relationship between 
them as civil law relationship according to Hungarian law, and then judged the case according to 
German substantive law  (Supreme Court Pkf. 5. 25.918/2008/2).
28 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002, Ofﬁ cial 
Journal L 168, 27/06/2002 43–50.
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these legal relations. There have been no changes recently in the application of the renvoi in 
the Hungarian judicial practice, it invariably occurs very rarely.29
3. Ordre Public and Mandatory Rules
The rules of ordre public (public policy) have not changed in the Hungarian legal system in 
the past decade. The regulation of public policy, in a sense of PIL, can be found in Article 7 
of the Code, but Act No. LXXXI of 1994 concerning commercial arbitration (hereinafter 
referred to as Arbitration Act) also contains public policy provisions. Even though the latter 
is not exactly identical with the concept of public policy as described by PIL, Hungarian 
judicial practice connects the two. Therefore, we will discuss it in what follows. 
The legislator has included in the system of the PIL Code the public policy rules of 
both private international and procedural law. The public policy clause can be found in the 
section concerning the disregard of foreign law. Article 7(1) gives a general deﬁ nition of 
public policy. It is a general clause, according to which the application of foreign law shall 
be disregarded where it would violate Hungarian public policy. This deﬁ nition aims at 
enforcing the defensive function of the public policy clause. Beyond that, it is the task of 
judicial practice to ﬁ ll it with content. The ordre public functions as a “shield” against 
foreign laws, in case the application of which may have a negative impact on Hungarian 
economic, political or social values. The auxiliary rule of Article 7(2) makes the general 
clause more precise; the application of foreign law shall not be disregarded solely on the 
ground that the socio-economic system of a particular foreign state differs from that of 
Hungary. With that the legislator brings the attention of the forum to the fact that the legal 
institution cannot be applied with a discriminatory intent. 
The PIL Code contains so-called “special public policy rules” related to a given ﬁ eld, 
which make the elements of public policy more precise for judicial practice in a given ﬁ eld. 
Such rules are the rules regarding divorce in Article 41a), b), and c); or the consideration of 
the rules of substantive law, which are the mandatory prerequisites for child adoption based 
on Article 43(4).30
29 a) A Hungarian male citizen emigrated to France and there he deceased as a French citizen. 
He left behind some property back in Hungary on intestacy and without direct lineal descendants. His 
Hungarian citizen siblings lay claim for the estate. The Hungarian notary applied Article 36 of the 
Code which states that inheritance relations are subject to the personal law of the deceased person that 
is the citizenship of the devisor. This in our case is the French law but in case of inheritance of 
immovable the French private international law enacts according to the situs of the immovable (lex rei 
sitae). The Hungarian forum accepted the renvoi and applied the Hungarian substantive law of 
succession. See Burián–Kecskés–Vörös: op. cit. 19–24.
  b) A Hungarian married couple emigrated from Hungary to Switzerland in 1956, where they 
acquired Swiss citizenship and later they moved back to Hungary. Under Article 39 of the Hungarian 
PIL Code: “The personal and property relations of the spouses […] shall be governed by the common 
personal law of the spouses at the time of lawsuit.” This could be the law of their common citizenship, 
the Swiss law, but the Swiss private international law rule in such a case determines the law of their 
common domicile (Art. 54 of IPRG), which could be found in Hungary. Therefore the judge accepted 
the reference back and applied the Hungarian substantive law. See Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 107.
30 Former special ordre public rules in the area of torts, provided that Hungarian court “shall not 
establish liability for conduct that is not unlawful under Hungarian law”, and “shall not impose legal 
consequences not known to Hungarian law”, were repealed in 2009. This amendment of the Code 
is welcome because Hungarian scholars sharply criticized these strict and one-sided regulations. 
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According to Article 41, the law applicable in cases of divorce should be determined 
based on the following three criteria:
a) A marriage may be dissolved even if its dissolution is excluded by the foreign law, 
or if the conditions of divorce are absent according to the foreign law but are present 
according to Hungarian law.
b) The question of whether marital life has been completely and irreparably ruined31 
shall be considered even is cases where absolute grounds for divorce are present according 
to the foreign law.
c) A marriage shall not be dissolved on the ground of fault.
According to the general opinion of leading Hungarian scholars, with this rule the 
legislator gave too much room for public policy intervention, for, opposed to the general 
ordre public rule, in this case close domestic connection is not a prerequisite. Due to the 
ﬂ exible nature of the public policy clause, the connection of the case to the legal system to 
be protected is one of the prerequisites for its applicability. 
There is also a special ordre public rule related to adoption. According to Article 43(4), 
adoption may not be permitted or approved by the guardianship authority except when it 
satisﬁ es the requirements of Hungarian law. For example, it is determined by Hungarian 
family law that only married couples are allowed to adopt in common a child. People living 
with their partner or in a registered partnership do not have the right to do so. The purpose 
behind this legal policy is to ensure that the child will be reared in a complete family as 
well as the creation of a family bond between the child and the adoptive parents. This 
imperative norm serves the interests of the child and embodies the social and moral values 
of Hungarian society. The PIL Code makes it more emphatic with a special public policy 
rule.
The Hungarian international procedural law is characterized by a complex, multi-
channel law source, in which the source of law for the judge in a particular case is precisely 
determined.32 In Hungarian law, the procedural rules of ordre public may be found in 
Section 11 of the Code as the primary reason for the recognition of foreign judgements. The 
Hungarian judge always has to take into consideration whether the impact of the recognition 
and enforcement of the foreign judgement contravenes the fundamental values of the 
Hungarian legal system such as the basic constitutional principles.
The Hungarian Arbitration Act regulates public policy problems in the ﬁ eld of setting 
aside of an arbitral award. According to the Hungarian rules this process, with reference to 
the violation of ordre public, may be initiated against a domestic arbitral award. This 
possibility and the fact that in the rigid system of setting aside of an award causes ordre 
public is a ﬂ exible and malleable legal institution had a signiﬁ cant impact on the 
development of Hungarian judicial practice. The vast majority of the judgements related to 
As Ferenc Mádl and László Burián pointed out, the application of these rules are unreasonable in 
cases when both the party responsible for the damage and the injured party are foreigners from the 
same country and Hungary is only the place where the damage has occurred. In that case, according 
to Burián, the application of the law of his/her country would be more favourable for the injured 
party. See Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 368–370, and Burián–Kecskés–Vörös: op. cit. 239.
31 Namely this requirement is a cogent rule in Hungarian family law, thus the court always has 
to examine it in a divorce case.
32 The Brussels Agreement, the Brussels I and II rules give directives concerning procedural 
law in ordre public, and these rules enjoy priority to domestic law.
147SELECTED ISSUES ON RECENT HUNGARIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFICATION
the application of public policy were born within the framework of a setting aside 
proceeding. While there is very little practice of the application of public policy rule in PIL, 
during setting aside proceedings references are most often made to the violation of public 
policy. The reason for that is to be found in the nature of the arbitration proceeding: it has 
only one instance. The indeﬁ nability of the content of the concept of ordre public further 
increases the chances for setting aside of an arbitration award, thereby offering the defeated 
party a last chance to escape the enforcement of the judgement.
Several Hungarian decisions were made in the latter issue. With a few exceptions, 
references to the violation of ordre public were unfounded. All in all, during the examination 
of the violation of ordre public the starting point is always the same, i.e. the theoretical 
foundations of PIL. This approach has resulted in an interesting situation. Namely, that 
Hungarian judicial practice does not differentiate between the concepts of PIL and 
international commercial public policy. These judgements have contributed to a great extent 
to the development of the contextual outline of Hungarian public policy. They never deﬁ ne 
directly the contextual components of public policy. Rather, they start out from a negative 
approach and state which elements do not belong to the narrowly interpreted domain of 
ordre public.33
The separation and interpretation of mandatory rules and public policy has not yet 
happened in Hungarian PIL. The Hungarian regulations do not contain speciﬁ c reference to 
the ﬁ eld of mandatory rules. Jurisprudence usually regards mandatory rules as a positive 
component of public policy, but does not state speciﬁ cally what requirements a given norm 
has to meet in order to gain an absolutely mandatory application. This is a question to 
which the answer will have to be found in the future. No judgement has been made 
concerning the application of imperative norms so far. 
33 In the following, there is a brief summary about a controversial decision, in which the 
Supreme Court has declared for the ﬁ rst time that an arbitral award violates Hungarian public policy. 
The decision was based on an arbitral award of arbitration in which the court rejected the suit of the 
plaintiff and based on the 32 billion HUF in dispute forced him/her to pay 290 million HUF in legal 
costs. The arbitral tribunal arrived at this amount in accordance with the requirements of proportionality 
adjusted to the amount in dispute. The defeated party ﬁ led a suit of setting aside of this award at the 
court, in which he/she found injurious the high legal costs and stated that it violates the values of 
Hungarian society, therefore it violates the ordre public. At the ﬁ rst instance the court found this 
reference unfounded and stated that even though the amount is unusually high, the arbitral tribunal 
arrived at the amount in accordance with the laws in force; therefore it does not violate the foundations 
of economic and social order. Consequently, the award does not violate Hungarian public policy. The 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court against the ﬁ nal verdict, claiming that the exceedingly high 
legal costs placed a disproportional burden on the defeated party and violated the value system of 
society. The Supreme Court found that even though the stipulated amount was in accordance with the 
law, it could limit the party in his/her right to turn to the court and deprive him/her of essential 
ﬁ nancial resources. It might also violate the value system of society, and if it remained in force, it 
would have a negative impact on Hungarian judicial practice. (Supreme Court Gfv. VI. 30.450/2002.)
   The decision caused a lot of professional debate. Many people questioned whether the amount 
of legal costs constitutes part of ordre public. It was also in question whether it can restrict the party 
in his/her right to turn to the court, for it was a ﬁ rm with considerable capital strength. The most 
heated debate was about the question of whether a judgement made in accordance with the laws in 
force can violate public policy.
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IV. Law Governing Contracts
The freedom of party autonomy in choosing the applicable law to international contracts 
had already been accepted in Hungarian judicial practice before the birth of the PIL Code. 
The Code adopts the choice of law possible as the primary connecting factor of the law 
governing contracts. The laconic provision constructed in 197934 was supplemented with a 
few additions in 2009. According to the new provision: “A contract shall be governed by 
the law chosen by the parties at the time of contracting or later to the whole or a part only 
of the contract. The choice must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by 
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case.” (Article 25). The Code, similarly 
to the Rome I Regulation, mentions primarily the express choice of law and deﬁ nes the 
implied choice of law as well. In this last point, however, there is a difference from the 
deﬁ nition in the Rome I Regulation. The second sentence in Article 3(1) of the Rome I 
Regulation is the following: “The choice shall be […] clearly demonstrated by the terms of 
the contract or the circumstances of the case.” In the Code it goes as follows: “[…] 
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of 
the case.”35 In this latter version implied and hypothetical choices of law can be hardly 
differentiated from each other, while only the former should be permitted.36
Regarding the time of choosing a law, it provides the parties the choice of law at the 
time of contracting as well as after concluding the contract (“at later”). According to the 
Code, the ﬁ rst time for the choice of law is the time of contracting, but it is also possible for 
the parties to select the applicable law before concluding the contract, for example within 
the framework agreement. Regarding the closing time for the choice of law, the beginning 
of the legal dispute37 or the end of the evidentiary procedure at ﬁ rst instance38 are considered 
in Hungarian legal literature as the theoretical limits. Hungarian judicial practice, as opposed 
to theoretical positions, permits the choice of law any time until delivering the judgement, 
even in procedure at the second instance (we should add that in these cases it has always 
meant the selection of the Hungarian law).39 Similarly to Article 3(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation, it should have been settled in the Hungarian PIL Code that the subsequent 
choice of law, or the changing of the law originally selected shall not prejudice the formal 
validity of the contract or adversely affect the rights of third parties.40
Depeçage: Even though the partitioning of a contract, or choosing several laws at the 
same time (depeçage) was possible based on the Hungarian PIL Code, it was the Rome 
Convention’s entering force that ﬁ nally clariﬁ ed the situation.
34 Article 24.
      The law chosen by the parties at time of contracting or later shall be applied to their contract.
35 It should be noted that the text is the result of the inaccurate translation of the Rome I 
Regulation.
36 See Vékás, L.: A nemzetközi magánjogi törvény módosításáról (On the Modiﬁ cation of the 
Act on Private International Law). Magyar Jog, 6 (2009), 322.
37 Ibid.
38 See Burián–Kecskés–Vörös: op. cit. 205.
39 Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.20 895/1992.; Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.VI.22 
046/1993.; Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.20 998/1995. See Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 348.
40 The legislator should have been made a provision concerning the question of the validity of 
the choice of law clause and the enforcement of the cogent rules of the law applicable in the absence 
of the choice of law against the rules of the chosen law (similarly to Article 3(5) and Article 3(3) of 
the Rome I Regulation). 
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The Rome Convention and Rome I Article 3(1) leave to the parties the complete or 
partial choice of law. The introduction of these rules removed the ambiguity that had been 
present before in the Hungarian regulation. Because the former rule of the Code regulated 
in one sentence the choice of law (Article 24), which, besides stating that the parties can 
choose a law either at the time of contracting or at a later time, contained no further 
provisions. From this regulation Hungarian jurisprudence41 concluded that if the Code does 
not prohibit the partition of the contract, then the parties are free to apply this practice. The 
same interpretation can be concluded through analogy from Article 30 as well. This Article 
states: “The governing law of contracts extends to all elements of the contractual relationship 
[…] and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or otherwise mandated by this Law-Decree, 
to any agreement securing the contract (mortgage, suretyship, etc.) as well as to any setoff, 
assignment and assumption of claims related to the contract.” Interpreting this rule, the 
parties have the right to agree to the application of several laws to their contract, but the 
same result can be reached by the simultaneous application of different articles of the Code 
as well. The latest modiﬁ cation of the Code affects this issue, because in the new Article 25 
the depeçage is expressed: “The law chosen to either the whole or the part of the contract 
by the parties […] shall be applied.”
Limitations of party-autonomy: The Code has no speciﬁ c provisions concerning the 
laws that may be chosen; therefore the choice of law is theoretically unlimited. It is even 
possible to choose a law which has no relationship of any kind with either the contract or 
the parties. In this respect, however, the choice of law clauses are interpreted strictly in 
Hungarian judicial practice.42 Taking into consideration the further limitations of the choice 
of law, the Hungarian PIL Code does not specify any other devices besides the ordre public 
clause. In other words, it has no provisions concerning the enforcement of the imperative 
rules of the forum or a third state, and does not set any limitation similar to the Article 3(3) 
of the Rome I Regulation in case of contract where all other elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law 
has been chosen.
Priority of protective law: These restrictions usually refer to contracts in which one 
party is perceived to be systematically in a weaker position, most importantly consumer 
contracts, employment contracts and insurance contracts. In the member states of the 
European Union these limitations are expressly laid down in the Rome I Regulation, 
therefore the 2009 modiﬁ cation repealed the relevant rules of the Code. 
Finally, as we have mentioned above, it is the result of the decision made by the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities in the case of Garcia Avello43 that the Hungarian 
PIL allows the application of the choice of law rule not only in contract law, but on name 
41 Ibid. 203.
42 For example, it “generally” chooses the Austrian law in legal disputes resulting from loan 
contracts, it does not extend its scope to the collateral contract securing the loan. (Supreme Court of 
Hungary Pf.I.25.615/2002/11.) In another case the court stated that regarding the choice of law the 
Code allows “only the selection of the law (legal system) of an explicitly chosen country”. 
(Metropolitan Court of Appeal Pf.6.20.577/2005/4.) (Thus the forum did not accept the clause “the 
rules of the Hungarian Civil Code” as an appropriate choice of law on the grounds that it was the 
choice of a rule, not the choice of a country’s law.)
43 C-148/02. Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613.
150 KATALIN RAFFAI–SAROLTA SZABÓ
bearing as well. According to Article 10(2), name bearing is governed by the lex personae 
of the individual, but in case of a request made by the individual involved, at the registration 
of the name of birth the law of that country shall be applied which the individual is a citizen 
of as well. 
In preliminary it can be stated that jurisdiction alone is not a connecting factor in 
conﬂ icts law. The jurisdiction of the court of a state does not necessarily mean that the 
substantive law of the given state should be applied. The function of PIL rules is overtly to 
make it possible for the forum not to use its own law. The rules of jurisdiction do not have 
a direct impact on the applicable substantive law, and it is true the other way round as well; 
the fact whether the applicable law is a domestic or a foreign one does not have any impact 
on the existence of jurisdiction. Consequently, the existence of jurisdiction and the choice 
of law are two separate issues. Although, the “qui eligit iudicem eligit ius” (if you choose a 
judge, you choose a law) is an old proposition in PIL, this principle does not generally 
apply in modern PIL. (We should note, however, that the picture is made more subtle by the 
preamble (recital 12) of the Rome I Regulation, according to which an exclusive choice of 
forum clause “should be one of the factors to be taken into account in considering whether 
a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated”.)
In the judgement of international contracts by a Hungarian court, there is a separation 
between jurisdiction and the selection of the applicable law. The freedom of party autonomy 
can extend to the choice of the forum as well as to the choice of law. In Hungarian judicial 
practice these clauses in general, either choice of law clauses or choice of forum clauses, 
are interpreted rather strictly,44 but the appropriately phrased or unambiguous clauses, 
including the arbitration clauses, are treated in the same way. 
In sum, we can say that with the EU Regulation coming into force the contract law 
rules of the Hungarian PIL Code play only a complementary role. Therefore, the demand of 
the modiﬁ cation of the “old” provisions of the Code was entirely justiﬁ ed. According to the 
new general rule of the Code, in the absence of the choice of law, the contract should be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 28). 
Regarding questions which are not within the scope of the Rome I Regulation, for example 
the contract of inheritance, marriage settlement, or the scope of the rights of the 
representative, the trust, the Code contains no speciﬁ c provisions (which can be a source of 
problems related to qualiﬁ cation). 
Some “old” rules of exception however have remained in the Code, which are the 
following: 
– The law of that state shall apply to contracts concluded on exchanges, at tender 
negotiations or auctions, in the territory of which the exchange is or the tender negotiation 
or auction is conducted. [Article 26(1)]; 
– A contract of association shall be adjudged according to the law of the state, in the 
territory of which the company pursues its activities. The personal law of the legal entity 
shall apply to a contract of association founding a legal entity. [Article 26(2)];
– The law governing at the place of performance shall apply to the existence and 
extent of obligations based upon securities. [Article 27(1)];
44 For example, the “jurisdiction of Brussels or courts of Brussels” clause was not acceptable, 
for only “the courts of a state or a certain court” should be selected. (Metropolitan Court of Appeal 
14.Gf.41.315/2003.)
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– The emergence, devolution, termination and enforcement of contractual rights and 
obligations based upon bonds issued on the basis of a public loan shall be adjudged 
according the issuer’s personal law. [Article 27(2)];
– If a security provides the right of disposal over goods, the provisions of this Law-
Decree relating to real rights shall apply to the real right effects. [Article 27(3)];
– If a security embodies membership rights, the emergence, devolution, termination 
and enforcement of the rights and obligations based upon the security shall be adjudged 
according to the personal law of the legal entity. [Article 27(4)].45
To sum up, regarding the selection of the law applicable to contracts (similarly to the 
rules of delictual liability) it can be stated that at the modiﬁ cation of the Hungarian PIL 
Code the legislator failed to exploit the opportunity provided for the modernization of the 
old rules.46 Therefore, Hungarian courts will remain responsible for the task of harmonizing 
the Rome I Regulation with the Code until a comprehensive codiﬁ cation is ﬁ nally made.
V. Law Governing Torts
In Volume 2 of his work Private International Law Ernst Rabel refers to the lex loci delicti 
commissi, developed by canonists and statutests, as a generally accepted principle in torts 
law. However, signiﬁ cant changes had taken place in the ﬁ eld by the end of the 20th century 
– beginning of the 21st century. There was a shift in emphasis from the tort-feasor to 
the injured party, and from injurious activity and personal liability the focus shifted to 
compensation.47 This “revolution” (or dethronement), as it was referred to by Ehrenzweig, 
led to the overthrow of the exclusiveness of the lex loci delicti commissi.48 Conﬂ icts law 
reacted to the above process in various ways: with the application of general clauses, the 
development of connecting factors differentiated for special delictions and the “loosening 
up” of traditional connecting factors with rules of exception.49
The 2009 modiﬁ cation of the Hungarian PIL Code has had an impact on the rules of 
the law applicable to questions of delictual liability. According to Act No. IX of 2009, with 
the modiﬁ cations the legislator was aiming at the integration of the Rome II Regulation into 
Hungarian law and the harmonization of domestic regulation with the conﬂ icts regulations 
of the EU. Therefore, Article 32 of the Code declares the priority of the Rome II Regulation. 
(Hungarian scholars do not think it should be explicitly stated due to the nature of the law 
source and to the fact that at the upcoming introduction of new private international law 
regulations the Code will have to be modiﬁ ed.50)
45 Judicial practice regarding the above mentioned remaining rules is unknown. 
46 Vékás: op. cit. 322.
47 Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 363.
48 See Ehrenzweig, A. A.: A Counter-Revolution in Conﬂ icts Law? From Beale to Cavers. 
Harvard Law Review, 80 (1966), 377.
49 Burián–Kecskés–Vörös: op. cit. 232–234.
50 This problem appears in contract law as well (Article 24). Hungarian scholars agree that 
Article 2 stating the subsidiary character of the Code (according to which “This Law-Decree shall not 
apply in matters which are regulated by international conventions.”) should have been complemented, 
which as a result would have declared the priority of the regulation as well. This would have given a 
guidance regarding general questions governed both by the regulations and the Code, such as renvoi 
and ordre public. See Vékás: op. cit. 322.
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The rules of Rome II Regulation and the preservation of the old provisions of the Code 
resulted in the creation of a two-channel system,51 which became a source of particular 
difﬁ culties for the courts. At the determination of the law applicable to torts the Code, in spite 
of the criticism coming from leading scholars,52 retained the connecting factor of lex loci 
delicti commissi (Article 33(1),53 while the Rome II Regulation follows the connecting factor 
of lex loci damni. The law of the state on whose territory the damage occurred remained in 
the form of favor laesi in the Hungarian Code; in other words, if its application is more 
favourable for the injured party [Article 33(2)].54 Therefore, this provision gives the judge a 
chance to select the proper applicable law in the so called cross-border tort cases, i.e. torts in 
which the injurious conduct occurred in one country and the injury in another country. The 
rule of “more favourable law” referred to in the Code cannot be applied selectively, only to 
certain claims.55 For example, the application of one Hungarian provision of the non-material 
damages instead of the otherwise applicable German law on damages for pain and suffering 
(Schmerzensgeld) is not possible on grounds that it is more favourable for the injured party.56 
The Hungarian Supreme Court has rejected the application of dépaçage, in contrast with an 
earlier court decision at a lower forum.57 The other problem occurring in judicial practice is 
related to the localization of the place where the damage occurred. In the above-mentioned 
case the forum regarded the place of indirect consequences as the place of the injurious 
activity. According to the facts of the case, Hungarian citizens suffered a trafﬁ c accident in 
Germany as a result of a German citizen’s breaking the law; therefore, both the lex loci delicti 
commissi, and the lex loci damni in a narrow sense lead to the application of the German law. 
However, the court interpreted the latter connecting factor in a broader sense and opted for 
the application of the law of the place of the ﬁ nancial consequences of the injurious activity 
(which in most cases leads to the habitual residence of the injured party); in other words, the 
court considered the “more favourable nature” of the application of the Hungarian law. 
Following these two general provisions, the Hungarian PIL Code declares two rules of 
exception. First, if it is justiﬁ ed by the identical social and legal environment the tort-feasor 
and the injured party domiciled in the same state, then the law of this state should be 
applied.58 At this point there is a difference between the Code and the Rome II Regulation: 
51 During the construction of Act No. IX of 2009 the legislator, instead of ﬁ lling the gaps in the 
Decree and harmonizing the two (European and domestic) regimes, only followed the principle of lex 
minimae and repealed the provisions governed by the Decree or deemed unnecessary for other reasons. 
See ibid. at 324.
52 See e.g. ibid.; Burián, L.: A deliktuális felelősség a magyar nemzetközi magánjogban (Torts 
in Hungarian Private International Law). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 3 (1990), 143–168.
53 Article 33.
  (1) Unless otherwise mandated by this Law-Decree, liability for non-contractual damage shall 
be subject to the law prevailing at the time and place of the tortuous act or omission.
54 Article 33. 
  (2) If it is more favourable for the injured party, the law of that state shall apply, in the territory 
of which the damage occurred.
55 Supreme Court of Hungary Pf.III.25.783/2002/5.
56 As the court states: “Certain concepts or legal institutions cannot be interpreted alone, taken 
out of context”. Ibid.
57 Metropolitan Court 4. P. 87.230/1981. See Mádl–Vékás: op. cit. 391.
58 Article 33.
  (3) If the tort-feasor and the injured party are domicile in the same state, the applicable law 
shall be of the state concerned.
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while the former prescribes the connection of the common domicile, the latter prescribes 
the connection of the common habitual residence [Article 4(2)], which is more accepted 
today. Second, in case of tortuous act or omission occurred on a registered vessel or aircraft, 
lex bandi should be applied.59 
Finally, the Code contains two supplementary-interpretational rules. On one hand, if, 
under the law of the place of the tortuous act or omission, liability is subject to fault, the 
existence of culpability may be determined either by the lex personae of the tort-feasor, or 
by the lex loci delicti commissi.60 On the other hand, whether the tortuous conduct consisted 
in violation of trafﬁ c or other safety regulations, it shall be determined according to the law 
of the place of the tortuous conduct.61 (We should note that Article 17 of the Rome II 
Regulation says the same concerning the issue, therefore the provision of the Hungarian 
Code will not be applied in the future.) Finally, as opposed to the Rome II Regulation 
[Article 4(3)], the Code does not allow the application of escape clauses which would give 
place to judicial discretion and thereby ensure ﬂ exibility. 
A means of “loosening up” the lex loci delicti is the choice of law rule, a theory 
originating from Raape and later further developed by Kropholler and Lorenz. The 
Hungarian PIL Code, contrary to the modern solution under the Rome II Regulation (Article 
14), does not adopt the choice of law rule, even though the party autonomy has been 
accepted by the Hungarian courts in the ﬁ eld of contractual relations since the beginning of 
the 20th century. The integration of the choice of law rule among the rules of conﬂ ict 
governing non-contractual relationships has not happened in spite of speciﬁ c proposals 
made by scholars.62 As a sole possibility, Hungarian PIL allows in the general provisions 
for the parties to request, by mutual agreement, the disregard of the applicable foreign law 
(Article 9); then the lex fori becomes the law applicable to the private international law 
dispute. However, the meaning of the expression “by mutual agreement” is vague and its 
judicial interpretation is by no means clear. In the case of a trafﬁ c accident caused in 
Romania by a Hungarian to a Slovakian citizen, the Supreme Court applied the Hungarian 
law instead of the Romanian law (despite the lex loci delicti commissi, lex loci damni 
referred to by the plaintiff in his appeal), stating that with their implicit conduct the parties 
requested the disregard of the applicable foreign (Romanian) law, for both the complaint of 
the plaintiff and the pleading of the defendant were based on the Hungarian Civil Code.63
There is an important difference between the Rome II Regulation and the Hungarian 
PIL Code. While the ﬁ rst contains a number of special rules, the latter does not provide 
separate choice-of-law rules for different types of torts, such as products liability, and 
environmental torts. We should note, however, that the Code does have provisions 
concerning the applicable law in case of the infringement of personal rights, although not in 
59 Article 34 (2). This rule is in fact a variety of the lex loci delicti commissi.
60 Article 33 (4).
61 Article 34 (1).
62 Burián, L.: Die Möglichkeiten der Rechtswahl im ungarischen IPR im Bereich des 
Deliktsrechts, des Erbrechts des Ehegüterrechts und des Arbeitsrechts. Budapest, 1987; Burián: A 
deliktuális felelősség… op. cit. 143–168.
63 Raffai sees the reasoning as the appearance of the homeward trend, and criticizes it saying 
that the disregard by mutual agreement can only be an explicit declaration. See Burián–Kecskés–
Vörös: op. cit. 353. The recognition of the disregard by mutual agreement based on implicit conduct 
(basically reference to Hungarian law in the procedure) appears in other legal relations (e.g. 
succession) as well. (Supreme Court of Hungary Pfv.I/a.20.879/2001/5.)
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the ﬁ eld of delictual liability. The Hungarian PIL Code calls for the application of the law 
of the place and the time of the injury, but the principle of “more favourable law” appears 
here as well, meaning that if the Hungarian substantive law is more favourable for the 
injured party concerning compensation or indemniﬁ cation, then that is the law which the 
judge should apply. We must add that the Rome II Regulation and the Hungarian PIL Code 
regulate the selection of the law applicable to the violation of intellectual property rights in 
the same way. 
In sum, the above-discussed dilemmas reveal that although the conﬂ ict rules of the 
Code on torts have only a subordinate role due to the Rome II Regulations in force, the 
Hungarian legislator should have already accomplished the harmonization and modernization 
of the conﬂ ict rules constructed in 1979, thereby avoiding the difﬁ culties arising from the 
application of the two-channel conﬂ icts law. 
VI. The Hungarian Judicial Application of PIL Rules
In short, the answer to the question of how the Code is applied in the Hungarian judicial 
practice is the following: it is characterized by contradictions. First of all, as a starting point 
for our research, we have found that only a few number of verdicts in the ﬁ eld of PIL have 
been published in recent years. On the other hand, it is a fact that the number of PIL cases 
to be settled by the court tends to rise. The analysis of the Hungarian judicial practice can 
be approached from two different aspects:
1. How are the provisions of the Code applied?
In case of certain general PIL instruments, such as the application of the rules of qualiﬁ cation, 
no real problem arises because courts usually follow the principle of lex fori (see Chapter 
IX). On the other hand, in case of other instruments, for example, concerning the present 
eclectic practice of the ordre public, there is no real agreement even on the issue of what 
elements the Hungarian public policy should include. Another neuralgic point of the judicial 
practice is the determination of the content of foreign law, which is the overt responsibility 
of the court, but sometimes they fail to do it. It may result in the unnecessary lengthening of 
legal procedures,64 or it may lead to a situation when the parties according to Article 9 ask 
for the disregard of foreign law by mutual agreement, and consequently the Hungarian law 
is applied instead. In connection with the above-mentioned Article 9 courts sometimes do 
not make a difference between the choice of law and the disregard of foreign law, but place 
an equal sign between them.65
2. How are the legal gaps ﬁ lled?
In order to present a typical example of ﬁ lling gaps, let us mention the judicial practice in 
connection with the consideration of incidental question. Despite the fact that the issue of 
incidental question is not settled in the Code, there is agreement in the judicial practice in 
this matter. According to general practice, it is considered independently, i.e. based on the 
principle of lex fori.66
64 In 2004 in the Karalyos and Huber v. Hungary case (75116/01) the European Court of Human 
Rights dismissed Hungary in connection with it.
65 Supreme Court Pf. VI. 21323/1996.
66 Supreme Court Pf. II. 20.992/1992.
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To sum up, the Hungarian judicial application represents a mixed scene in terms of 
practice. It is the task of jurisprudence to draw attention to the shortcomings as well as to 
provide adequate and appropriate theoretical solutions for the arising problems. In 2003 a 
professional discussion started between the representatives of jurisprudence and judicial 
practice. To serve the harmonization of legal theory and practice, every year a PIL 
conference is organized by Hungarian law faculties on different issues of Hungarian private 
international law.
